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Abstract
GENERIC DRUG POLICY IN THE U.S. –
IMPACT ON DRUG PRICES AND SHORTAGES

Ravi Gupta

Generic medicines offer a significantly cheaper alternative to brand-name
drugs and have become an indispensable means of maintaining patient access and
adherence to treatments. In recent years, as a result of monopolistic and
oligopolistic conditions, generic drugs have begun to increase in price, sometimes
exorbitantly. The competitiveness of drug markets with respect to the number of
generic manufacturers and the implications for drug prices and shortages have not
been systematically studied.
Two main analyses are presented in this study. First, using publicly available
information, the timing of generic drug approvals and the total number of generic
manufacturers for all small-molecule drugs approved between 1984 and 2015 were
characterized. Second, this study investigated the impact on drug prices and
shortages of a specific FDA regulation, called the Unapproved Drugs Initiative.
The first analysis demonstrates that among 417 FDA-approved drugs, 210
were eligible for generic competition, and 77 (37%) had three or fewer generic
drugs approved: 16 had three generic approvals, 9 had two, 16 had one, and 36 had

zero. Among the 174 drugs with at least one generic approval, the median number
of generic approvals was 7 (IQR, 4-12). Generic approvals were fewer among
orphan-designated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (18 of
33 [55%] vs. 156 of 177 [88%]; p<0.001).
The second analysis found that since 2006, 34 unapproved prescription
drugs had been addressed by the Unapproved Drugs Initiative (UDI). Nearly 90% of
those that went on to receive FDA approval were supported by literature reviews or
bioequivalence studies, not new clinical trials. In addition, once targeted by the UDI,
drugs experienced price and shortage increases of nearly 40% and 74%,
respectively.
Overall, more than one-third of drugs approved after 1984 and without
protection from patents have three or fewer generic competitors, making them
vulnerable to price increases. By unintentionally reducing the number of
manufacturers for specific drugs, the FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative led to
higher prices and more frequent and longer shortages, highlighting the importance
of robust generic competition.
In conclusion, insufficient pharmaceutical competition has created an
environment enabling price increases of old, off-patent generic drugs, such as
Daraprim and Epipen. This study highlights that a substantial number of additional,
similar drugs is vulnerable to such price increases for a variety of reasons. Future
efforts to reform generic drug policy should seek to boost generic competition, more
carefully regulate drug prices, and address brand-name pharmaceutical companies’
strategies to obstruct the ability of generic manufacturers to compete. In addition,

physicians and patients should be bettered educated on the fact that a lack of
generic competitors may mean that simply prescribing generic drugs will not make
medications affordable for patients; alternative options may have to be explored.
Such efforts are essential in ensuring continued patient access to affordable drugs.
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A Note on Publication

The research presented in this thesis has been conducted while I have been a
student at the Yale School of Medicine. Some of the analyses have been published in
the biomedical literature over the past year,1,2 while others are currently under
review.

Gupta, R., Kesselheim, A.S, Downing, N., Greene, J., Ross, J.S. Generic Drug Approvals
Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. JAMA Internal Medicine. Jul 18
2016;176(9):1391-1393.

Gupta, R., Shah, N.D., Ross, J.S. The Rising Price of Naloxone – Risks to Efforts to Stem
Overdose Deaths. New England Journal of Medicine. Dec 8 2016;375(23):2213-2215.

Gupta, R., Dhruva, S.S., Fox, E., Ross, J.S. The FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative – An
Observational Study of the Consequences for Drug Prices and Shortages in the
United States. (under review)
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Introduction
Increasing prescription drug prices in the United States are a cause of
growing concern for patients, providers, payers, and policymakers. Total spending
on prescription drugs grew approximately 20% between 2013 and 2015,
constituting nearly 17% of total U.S. health care cost in 2015 and outpacing overall
U.S. healthcare spending growth.3,4 Increasing expenditures and prescriptions both
explain this rapid growth in total spending, though the fact that expenditures have
risen more quickly than the number of prescriptions indicates that changes in price
have contributed more to the spending growth. In 2014 and 2015, a surge in
approvals of patent-protected brand-name drugs and price increases for already
existing drugs protected from competition by patents and exclusivity both led to
increased drug expenditures.
A separate contributor to the overall rise in prescription drug costs has been
the marked increase in prices of old medicines that are no longer protected by
patents.5 Despite the fact that these drugs have expired patents and are thus eligible
for competition from generic competitors, many exist in monopolistic or
oligopolistic markets. This latter phenomenon is increasingly problematic as it can
lead to decades-old drugs that are prohibitively expensive. The role of generic
competitors in enabling this trend has not been systematically studied and requires
careful attention.

Generic Medicines as a Solution: Driving Competition
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Generic medicines are interchangeable with their brand-name counterparts
and play an essential role in health care in the U.S., providing high-value care at
substantial cost-savings relative to brand-name pharmacological treatments,6
thereby enhancing patient access to therapy by increasing patient adherence,7
improving health care outcomes,8 and curbing overall health spending.9,10 Smallmolecule generic drugs have consistently been demonstrated to offer an effective
and safe option in clinical care.8
Prior to the early 1980s, however, relatively few drugs were available in
generic form in the U.S.11,12 and constituted fewer than 20% of all prescriptions.13
Resistance from brand-name drug manufacturers, who sought to protect their
market share, and the lack of a clear pathway for generic drug approval at the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), slowed the spread of generics.12,14 This
changed, however, with the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
(Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, which crystallized a pathway for the approval of
generic medicines, helping to facilitate generic drug availability, while also
enhancing incentives for the research and development of brand-name drugs.
Whereas new drugs containing active ingredients that have not previously been
approved submit New Drug Applications (NDA), this law formalized an abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) process in which generic drug manufacturers can
gain FDA approval for off-patent products. Instead of repeating lengthy, expensive
controlled clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy for an already approved
drug, generic drugs must meet the standards of bioequivalence. These standards
require that the generic have the same active ingredient(s) in the same formulation
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and strength and be as available to or absorbed as equally in the human body as the
original brand-name drug. Generic manufacturers must still satisfy additional
regulatory requirements, including labeling, pharmacology and/or toxicology,
chemistry, manufacturing, and inspection.14
The Hatch-Waxman Act created additional mechanisms to protect brandname drugs from generic competition. First, it extended the term of a drug’s patent
to compensate the patent holder for the marketing time lost while awaiting FDA
review and approval, which can take 6 to 8 years.15 A maximum of 5 years of
extension is allowed, up to a total of 14 years of patent life from the date of drug
approval.16
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a separate, five- or seven-year
New Chemical Exclusivity period for new drugs containing at least one active
ingredient that has previously never been approved.16 During this market
exclusivity period, competing applications from generic manufacturers may not be
submitted. However, after 4 years of exclusivity have passed, competitors can file
ANDA applications but must also simultaneously 1) demonstrate the original patent
is invalid or is not infringed by the generic product (i.e. “paragraph IV certification”),
and 2) notify the patent-holder of the submission of the ANDA. The patent-holder
can file a lawsuit against the generic applicant claiming infringement on the patent,
in which case the FDA postpones by 30 months the generic manufacturer’s
application approval, unless the lawsuit is settled before the 30-month period.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also created an incentive for generic applicants in
which the first ANDA filer to successfully challenge a brand-name manufacturer’s
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existing patent enjoys a 180-day exclusivity period.16 Additional generic
manufacturers can enter the market only after the conclusion of this exclusivity
period. Overall, the median time between brand-name drug approval and first
generic availability has remained relatively stable at approximately 12-13 years.17-19
Patents and market exclusivity create monopolies for manufacturers of
brand-name drugs, allowing them to set high prices. Once they expire, competition
from generic manufacturers can quickly and significantly reduce these prices
(Figure 1).6,20 The Hatch-Waxman Act, in concert with the passage of automatic
substitution state laws throughout the U.S. allowing pharmacists to substitute
generic versions for brand-name drug prescriptions, has led to a remarkable
increase in the availability of generic medications. Generic drugs now constitute
89% of all prescriptions filled in pharmacies in the U.S. while comprising only 27%
of total drug costs.21 Between 2005 and 2014 alone, generic drugs were responsible
for an estimated $1.7 trillion in savings to the U.S. health system.22

Figure 1. FDA Analysis of Effect of Generic Competition on Drug Prices
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Generic Medicines as a Problem: Monopolistic/Oligopolistic Conditions
Despite the rapid cost-savings enabled by generics, there have been several
specific examples of sudden and dramatic price increases of drugs that are no longer
protected by patents and have been available as generics for years. Pyrimethamine,
for instance, a drug approved in 1953 to treat toxoplasmosis and available as a
generic for decades, was acquired in 2015 by Turing Pharmaceuticals, which
immediately raised its price from $13.50 to $750.23 Similar price increases for old,
off-patent drugs such as Isuprel (generic: isoproterenol) and Epipen (generic:
epinephrine) have led to multiple Congressional investigations into companies’
pricing strategies.24-26
These individual examples are part of a larger trend of increasing prices for
existing generics. Between 2006 and 2012, though the average generic price for
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widely used drugs decreased by 7% to 14%, one-third of these generics actually
increased in price in 2013.27 A more recent U.S. Government Accountability Office
report showed that between 2010 and 2015, more than 20% of generic drugs
covered under Medicare Part D had price increases of 100% or more, thereby
blunting the overall decline in generic drug prices.28 The report also found that the
new prices persisted for at least one year and most did not eventually return to their
baseline.
The number of generic drugs approved by the FDA can help explain these
generic price increases, with prior research showing largely similar but not
completely consistent findings (Table 1). A 1998 Congressional Budget Office
analysis concluded that the availability of five generics resulted in an average price
reduction of 40 percent from the brand-name drug price.29 Two other analyses
found a similar price-manufacturer threshold: one demonstrated that four generics
led to a price reduction of approximately 60 percent,30 while another analysis of
industry pricing data showed that four to five generics led to a 25 percent reduction,
and 10 generics led to a 30 percent reduction.31,32 In contrast, an FDA analysis of
sales data for drug products sold from 1999 to 2004 demonstrated that only two
generic approvals were needed for a 50 percent reduction from the initial price, and
four to five for a 60 percent price reduction (Figure 1).6 Overall, four generic
competitors seem to ensure substantial price reductions from brand-name levels. In
addition, sufficient numbers of generic competitors preclude monopolistic or
oligopolistic conditions that companies can take advantage of by sharply increasing
prices.33,34
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Table 1. Studies Examining Effect of Generic Competition on Drug Pricing
Author

Title

Year Summary

Congressional

How Increased

1998  5 generics led to 40%

Budget Office

Competition from Generic

price reduction

Drugs has Affected Prices
and Returns in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
Berndt E.R., et

Authorized generic drugs,

al

price competition, and

2007  4-5 generics led to 20% 60% price reduction

consumers' welfare
Reiffen D.,

Generic Drug Industry

Ward M.R.

Dynamics

2005  4-5 generics led to 25%
price reduction
 10 generics led to 30%
price reduction

Food & Drug

Generic Competition and

Administration Drug Prices

2010  2 generics led to 50%
price reduction
 4-5 generics led to 60%
price reduction
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A systematic study of the competitiveness of drug markets is lacking,
however. Thus, in the first analysis of this study, we characterize generic drug
approvals for all new drugs approved since 1984 as a tablet or capsule, including the
number of generic manufacturers that have received FDA approval and their timing,
as well as associations between generic drug approval and specific drug product
characteristics, such as priority review status, orphan drug designation, and
therapeutic category. We select four generic drug approvals as a sufficient threshold
for stimulation of price competition based on prior research. By characterizing the
number of generic versions for each drug, this analysis will help reveal the extent to
which off-patent drugs are vulnerable to price increases, including sudden price
changes of drugs like pyrimethamine, which currently has only one manufacturer.
Several factors can explain why certain drugs may have few generic
competitors, despite being off-patent and available for years. Availability of raw
materials, production difficulties, industry mergers and acquisitions, potential
profits of specific drug markets, FDA application backlogs, and various barriers
erected by brand-name manufacturers all determine the number of generic
manufacturers of specific drugs.27,28,35
In some cases, off-patent drugs have been combined with new modes of
delivery, such as the Epipen auto-injector. Though the actual drug is not patented
(in Epipen’s case epinephrine), the new mode of delivery often can be, allowing
companies monopolies through which they can raise prices precipitously. This is
exactly what has happened with Epipen, which has combined an old drug with a
new delivery system and due to the delivery system’s patent has raised its price. An
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additional example of this is naloxone, which has received comparatively less
attention and is discussed later in this study in detail as a case study of the effect of
limited generic competition.
Furthermore, well-meaning regulations can sometimes also unintentionally
lead to fewer manufacturers and monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions for
companies to take advantage of. In the second analysis of this study, we carefully
investigate the impact on drug prices and shortages of one such FDA regulation,
known as the Unapproved Drugs Initiative (UDI).

FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative
Hundreds of drugs are currently marketed in the U.S. without having first
received approval from the FDA. Most of these drugs are decades-old and available
largely as an unintended consequence of early legislation (Table 2).36,37 The 1906
Federal Food and Drugs Act first brought drug regulation under federal law,
prohibiting interstate commerce in misbranded drugs. The 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act required manufacturers of new drugs to provide evidence of safety,
but not efficacy, to the FDA for approval. In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments
broadened the FDA’s authority, establishing requirements to also provide evidence
of efficacy for FDA approval. Drugs that were “identical, related, or similar (IRS)” to
approved drugs were also required to obtain approval either through an NDA or an
abbreviated NDA (ANDA).
To retrospectively determine the efficacy of drugs approved only on the basis
of safety evidence between 1938 and 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments
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established the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) review, requiring
market withdrawal of drugs found to be inefficacious.38,39 While over 3,400 drugs
were evaluated through this process, drugs without FDA approval still remained on
the market. Most of these unapproved drugs were originally introduced before
1938, while others were originally introduced between 1938 and 1962 but the
manufacturer did not comply with the DESI review decision.36

Table 2. FDA Regulations Pertaining to Unapproved Prescription Drugs
Regulation

Year of

Summary

enactment
Pure Food and Drug

1906

Act

First brought drug regulation under
federal law, prohibiting interstate
commerce in misbranded drugs

Food, Drug, and

1938

Cosmetic Act
Kefauver-Harris

of safety
1962

Amendments
Drug Efficacy Study

New drugs required to provide evidence

New drugs required to provide evidence
of efficacy

1962

Review efficacy of drugs approved

Implementation

between 1938 and 1962 only on basis of

(DESI) review

safety

Unapproved Drugs
Initiative

2006

Require approval or market removal of
currently marketed unapproved drugs
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Although manufacturers were expected to obtain approval for unapproved
drugs or withdraw them from the market, their persistent market availability led
the FDA to enact the UDI in 2006. The FDA developed a plan to require either the
approval of unapproved drugs or their removal from the market through issuance of
warning letters or, in some cases, a “seizure, injunction, or other proceeding”.36 As
part of the UDI, the FDA identifies unapproved drugs being marketed in the U.S.
through reports of safety issues, lack of effectiveness, health fraud, and compliance
inspections.36 The UDI directs the FDA to employ a risk-enforcement approach,
prioritizing drugs that pose greater risks from lack of safety or effectiveness. The
FDA also continues to rely on compliance efforts from manufacturers who
voluntarily obtain FDA approval for their previously unapproved drugs.
Though the FDA has taken regulatory action on more than 500 versions of
unapproved drugs through the UDI, representing 34 active ingredients, hundreds
more still exist as different dosages, formulations, and combinations.36 The FDA
estimated that approximately two percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the U.S.
in 2006 may have been for versions of drugs that had not received FDA approval.37
Sublingual nitroglycerin provides an illustrative example. Used by millions of
patients for relief of angina, the drug was marketed until 2010 by multiple
manufacturers without approval; 80% of nearly 4.4 million prescriptions for
sublingual nitroglycerin in 2009 were for versions of the drug that never received
FDA approval.40
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While the UDI benefits public health by ensuring marketed drugs have
demonstrated safety and efficacy, it may also have unintended consequences. Once
the FDA acts against an unapproved drug, fewer manufacturers remain in the
market, potentially enabling drug price increases and greater susceptibility to drug
shortages. Previous articles have explored the historical background for the
UDI39,41,42 and characterized the experience of individual unapproved drugs,43-45
including finding that prices46-49 and shortages50 of specific drugs increased after
they were targeted by the UDI. While these isolated examples highlight particularly
problematic consequences, there is a need for the systematic study of the prices and
shortages of all previously unapproved drugs targeted by the UDI. Thus, our
objective in this study’s second analysis is to identify previously unapproved
prescription drugs that faced FDA UDI regulatory action or received FDA approval
after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance with the UDI, comparing
prices and the presence and duration of shortages for these drugs before and after
UDI action, and characterizing the clinical evidence used to support their approval.
Understanding the effects of this FDA policy can help illuminate how specific,
well-intentioned regulations can also lead to increases in drug prices and shortages,
particularly within the context of price and shortage increases of old, off-patent
drugs overall.5,51 Moreover, such an analysis can help identify specific policy
suggestions to refine the UDI in order to ensure continued patient access to
important drugs.
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Statement of Purpose
In this study, I aim to systematically and empirically evaluate through two
analyses the current competitiveness of the U.S. generic pharmaceutical market,
with respect to the availability of generic medicines and the implications for drug
prices and shortages. The first analysis provides a comprehensive characterization
of all medicines approved during the study period, while the second analysis
evaluates the unintended consequences of a specific FDA initiative pertaining to old
medicines, known as the Unapproved Drugs Initiative.

A. Generic drug approvals since the 1984 Hatch Waxman Act:
Characterization of the timing of generic drug approvals and total
number of generic manufacturers for all tablet or capsule small-molecule
drugs approved between 1984 and 2015.

B. Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug
prices and shortages: Systematic examination of the clinical evidence
for approval, and a before-after analysis of prices and shortages of
previously unapproved prescription drugs after being addressed by the
UDI.
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Methods
A Note on Contribution
All data collection and analysis were performed by the author unless
otherwise specified.

Analysis A: Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act
Data Sources
Data on FDA drug approvals were obtained from Drugs@FDA,52 a publicly
accessible database maintained by the FDA that provides a comprehensive listing of
approved drug products, including generic versions, as well as approval dates and
corresponding regulatory action dates. Each drug’s active ingredient via their
generic name, method of formulation, dosage, market status (discontinued vs
currently available), and type of drug approval (e.g. new drug, new formulation, new
combination, etc.) are listed.

Study Sample
Data were downloaded from Drugs@FDA in January 2016 for drug products
approved between October 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. We excluded all drug
products approved before and after these dates. We constructed a sample of drugs
approved under a New Drug Application (NDA), excluding tentative approvals,
biologic therapies, reformulations, combination therapies of non-novel therapeutic
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agents, over-the-counter drugs, therapeutics not formulated as a tablet or capsule,
and duplicate listings (Figure 2). When multiple dosage strengths of a drug were
identified, we selected the currently marketed dosage; if all dosages had been
discontinued, we randomly selected one for inclusion.
In addition, we excluded from our sample drugs with current patent
protections or market exclusivity. Patent and exclusivity data were identified from
the Orange Book53 in January 2016. The Orange Book is an annual, publicly
accessible FDA publication listing approved drug products and their bioequivalent
generics. Drugs with current patent protections or market exclusivity were excluded
because they are ineligible for generic competition.
Finally, we excluded drugs discontinued because of safety or effectiveness
reasons (determined through online searches of public sources and company
websites), since they are not eligible for generic competition. In contrast, drugs
discontinued for non-safety or effectiveness reasons were included since they
remain eligible for generic competition; these drugs may be currently marketed as
subsequent reformulations.

Figure 2. Sample Construction of New Drug Products Approved by FDA After
September 30, 1984
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New Drug Characteristics
All drug products were categorized as currently marketed or discontinued
based on Drugs@FDA data; all dosages of a drug product needed to be discontinued
for it to be considered discontinued. All drug products were also categorized based
on whether the FDA assigned priority review status to the original NDA and
whether it received an orphan drug designation for the initial approval indication.
Priority review status was determined using the Drugs@FDA database and
confirmed using Aaron S. Kesselheim’s (A.S.K) prior analysis of FDA drug approvals
since 1938.54 The FDA designates priority review status to drugs considered to be
therapeutically important advances, and subsequently requires expedited
regulatory review by the FDA.55 Orphan designation was determined using the
FDA’s Orphan Drug Product designation database.56 This designation awards
extended market exclusivity for drugs that treat rare diseases affecting fewer than
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200,000 individuals per year in the US.57 We also classified drugs into one of seven
therapeutic classes based on the FDA-approved indication for use of the tablet or
capsule formulation using the World Health Organization’s Anatomic Therapeutic
Classification system;58 when a brand-name drug was approved for multiple
indications in different therapeutic categories (n=3 approvals), we assigned it to the
category for which it was first approved.

Identifying Generic Versions
Using Drugs@FDA, we identified FDA-approved abbreviated New Drug
Applications (ANDA) for bioequivalent generic drugs, based on matching the active
ingredient and route of administration. For each identified generic drug, we selected
the first approved dosage of each manufacturer. We excluded tentative approvals
and duplicate applications filed for the same generic drug by the same
manufacturer.
For each drug product, as our main outcome, we determined whether there
had been any bioequivalent generic drug approvals and, if so, the total number. We
also determined which drug products had four or more approved generic drugs. For
every generic drug identified, the date of drug approval was recorded. For all drug
products, we examined generic drug approval dates at successive time points after
first generic drug approval.

Statistical Analysis
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For drug products eligible for generic competition, we determined the
proportion for which any bioequivalent generic drug was approved and the
proportion with four or more generic drugs approved. Among drugs with at least
one generic drug approval, we determined the median number of generic drug
approvals. Next, we determined the median number of generic drugs approved at
specific time points: first generic drug approval, 180 days after first approval, one
year, five years, 10 years, and 15 years.
Finally, we used χ2 tests to explore the likelihood of any generic drug
approval and the likelihood of having four or more generic drug approvals based on
current market availability, priority review status, orphan drug designation,
therapeutic category, and year of approval. Based on these same characteristics, we
used nonparametric testing to compare the median number of generic drugs. For all
analyses, we used a p value of 0.01 to account for multiple comparisons of the
characteristics specified above. Analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel
2010 (Microsoft Corp.; Redmond, WA), JMP Pro 11 (SAS Institutes; Cary, NC), and
Stata 12.0 (StatCorp; College Station, TX).

Analysis B: Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug
prices and shortages
Study Sample
In the second analysis, we constructed a sample of previously unapproved
prescription drugs that either 1) faced UDI regulatory action or 2) received at least
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one FDA approval after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance with the
UDI; we excluded previously unapproved over-the-counter drugs because they are
subject to a different FDA review process.
Previously unapproved drugs facing UDI regulatory action were identified
through review of a publicly accessible database of all FDA warning letters since
2006.59 In some instances, warning letters are sent to individual manufacturers of a
drug, while in others, blanket warning letters are issued to all manufacturers of
drugs containing specific unapproved active ingredients (hereafter referred to only
as ‘drugs’). For example, in 2007 the FDA issued a warning letter to all
manufacturers of any unapproved drug products containing hydrocodone bitartrate
or any other salt or ester of hydrocodone, including both cough-suppressants and
pain relievers.60
Previously unapproved drugs that received approval through a
manufacturer’s voluntary compliance were identified from Drugs@FDA, a publicly
accessible database that provides a comprehensive listing of approved drug
products. This database was used to identify all New Drug Applications (NDAs) for
drugs previously “marketed without an approved NDA”.52 Some drugs were labeled
as previously “marketed without an approved NDA” and also faced UDI regulatory
action. In these cases, if the drug received at least one NDA approval with such a
label before regulatory action, it was categorized as a voluntary approval. If the drug
received all such NDA approvals after regulatory action, it was categorized as having
faced UDI regulatory action.
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Clinical Evidence
For all drugs that received at least one approval after 2006 either after
issuance of UDI warning letters or through voluntary compliance, we characterized
the clinical evidence supporting approval, including whether the application
submitted evidence from newly conducted clinical trials to demonstrate safety and
efficacy or relied on previously published literature or bioequivalence studies. This
information was determined by reviewing each drug’s NDA approval documents
available at Drugs@FDA. For previously unapproved drugs that received approval
through voluntary compliance, we reviewed the specific drug manufacturer’s NDA
approval documents. For drugs facing UDI regulatory action, we reviewed the NDA
approval documents of the first manufacturer to obtain approval after the date of
UDI regulatory action; abbreviated NDA documents were not reviewed since they
are for approval of generic drugs, which are required only to demonstrate
bioequivalence to their NDA counterparts.

U.S. Drug Prices
We determined the change in average price for each drug during the two
years before and after UDI regulatory action or approval through voluntary
compliance using drugs’ average wholesale prices from Micromedex’s Redbook
database.61 For each drug, we identified the manufacturer with the lowest average
unit price in the two years prior to voluntary approval or UDI action and with the
most complete data among all manufacturers (i.e. with listed prices each year). We
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used unit prices, which are per gram, per milliliter, or per piece (e.g. pill), because
some drugs in our sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed.
When the selected drug manufacturer did not list the price in certain years, we
determined the price of the cheapest version of the same dose from a different
manufacturer. Thus, for example, if the FDA required UDI compliance for a drug in
2009 and only one manufacturer had a price listed in 2007 and 2008, but the same
manufacturer had no price listed in either 2010 or 2011, we determined the lowest
listed price in 2010 and 2011 of a different manufacturer.
To identify the before and after time point, for drugs approved voluntarily,
we used the year of approval, whereas for drugs facing UDI action, we used the
compliance date stated in the warning letters, since in the time between the warning
letter issuance and compliance date, some manufacturers may have discontinued
unapproved drugs while others may have received approval for previously
unapproved drugs. When a drug was approved through a manufacturer’s voluntary
compliance and other manufacturers subsequently faced UDI action, we used the
date of the UDI warning letter compliance.
In addition, where available, we identified the specific manufacturers to
which the FDA sent UDI warning letters or that were labeled as previously
“marketed without an approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA. We used the Redbook to
examine the price changes immediately before and after the date that these specific
manufacturers faced regulatory action or obtained approval for the drugs.

U.S. Drug Shortages
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We used the University of Utah’s Drug Information Service drug shortage
dataset from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2015. A shortage is defined as a
supply issue that affects how a pharmacy prepares or dispenses a drug product that
influences patient care when prescribers must use an alternative agent.62 The Drug
Information Service publishes critical drug shortage information on a public website
(www.ashp.org/shortage) hosted by the American Society of Health-System
Pharmacists and receives voluntary reports of drug shortages via a reporting
feature on the website. Clinical pharmacists at the service confirm each reported
shortage by determining all potential manufacturers of a reported drug shortage
and all drug presentation National Drug Codes (NDCs). Each manufacturer is
contacted to determine which NDCs are in shortage at a national level. A shortage is
considered resolved when all suppliers have all presentations available or have
discontinued their products, or when FDA reports on its website63 that the shortage
has been resolved.
For each drug, we determined whether there was a shortage during the two
years before and after the date of UDI regulatory action or approval through
voluntary compliance. For both before and after this date, if there was a shortage,
we determined the median duration of the shortage in days for each drug. Shortages
beginning and ending on the same day or lasting fewer than 7 days were excluded
from the calculation of shortage duration because these shortages signify that the
drug was withdrawn from the market, and the true shortage end date cannot be
determined. To identify the before and after time point, for drugs approved
voluntarily, we used the year of approval, whereas for drugs facing UDI action, since
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a shortage could ensue immediately after a manufacturer discontinued the drug, we
used the date that the warning letter was issued. When a drug was approved
through a manufacturer’s voluntary compliance and other manufacturers
subsequently faced UDI action, we used the issue date of the UDI warning letter. For
each drug, there may have been multiple shortages reported by different
manufacturers; if these shortages overlapped in time, it was counted as only one.
Each shortage was attributed to the year in which the shortage was active. For
example, if a shortage began in October 2009 and ended in March 2011, it was
counted for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.

Statistical Analysis
We used descriptive statistics to characterize the sample of included drugs
and the clinical evidence that supported applications for drugs approved after 2006
through either voluntary compliance or after issuance of UDI warning letters. We
used signed rank sum and χ2 tests to compare changes in prices and shortages of
each drug. All statistical tests were two-sided and used a p-value of 0.05 for
significance. All analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft
Corp.; Redmond, WA) and Stata 12.0 (StatCorp; College Station, TX).
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Results
Analysis A: Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act
Between October 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015, the FDA approved 417
NDAs for drug products in tablet or capsule formulation. Among these, 185 (44%)
are still protected by active patents or other exclusivity prohibiting bioequivalent
generic drug approvals and 22 (5%) have been discontinued for safety or
effectiveness reasons. Among the remaining 210 drug products eligible for generic
drug competition, 163 (78%) are currently marketed and 47 (22%) have been
discontinued. The FDA granted priority review to 82 (39%) and designated 33
(16%) as orphan drugs at the time of approval. Cardiovascular disease, diabetes
mellitus, or hyperlipidemia were the most common approved indications (n=55
[26%]) (Table 3).

Table 3. New Drug Products (Eligible for Generic Competition) Approved by
the US Food and Drug Administration After September 30, 1984
No (%)
New Drug Products (n = 210)
Availability
Currently Marketed

163 (77.6)

Discontinued

47 (22.4)

Priority Review
Yes

82 (39.0)
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No

128 (61.0)

Orphan Drug Designation
Yes

33 (15.7)

No

177 (84.3)

Therapeutic Category
Autoimmune/musculoskeletal

20 (9.5)

Cancer

11 (5.2)

Cardiovascular, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia

55 (26.2)

Infectious disease

37 (17.6)

Neurology

26 (12.4)

Psychiatry

25 (11.9)

Other

36 (17.1)

Approval Year
1984-89

40 (19.0)

1990-94

53 (25.2)

1995-99

81 (38.6)

2000-Present

36 (17.1)

Number of Generic Drug Approvals
Among the 210 drug products eligible for generic drug competition, there
was no bioequivalent generic drug approval for 36 (17%) (Table 4). Among the
remaining 174 with at least one generic drug approval, 16 had three generic drug

27

approvals, 9 had two generic drug approvals, and 16 had only one generic drug
approval. Thus, 37% (77 of 210) of drug products had three or fewer bioequivalent
generic drugs approved (Figure 3). Among drugs with at least one generic drug
approval, the median number of generic drug approvals was 7 (IQR, 4-12).

Table 4. Proportion of New Drug Products Approved After 1984 with Generic
Drug Approvals, Stratified by Availability, Priority Review, Orphan Drug
Designation, Therapeutic Category, and Approval Year
No. (%)
At least 1 generic

4 or more generic

drug approval

drug approvals

(n=174)

(n=133)

Currently Marketed (n=163)

142 (87.1)

109 (66.9)

Discontinued (n=47)

32 (68.1)

24 (51.1)

0.002

0.05

Yes (n=82)

61 (74.4)

44 (53.7)

No (n=128)

113 (88.3)

89 (69.5)

0.01

0.02

Yes (n=33)

18 (54.5)

9 (27.3)

No (n=177)

156 (88.1)

124 (70.1)

< 0.001

< 0.001

Characteristic
Availability

P value
Priority Review

P value
Orphan Drug Designation

P value
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Therapeutic Category
Autoimmune/musculoskeletal

16 (80.0)

15 (75.0)

7 (63.6)

3 (27.3)

hyperlipidemia (n=55)

51 (92.7)

41 (74.5)

Infectious disease (n=37)

25 (67.6)

17 (45.9)

Neurology (n=26)

26 (100.0)

20 (76.9)

Psychiatry (n=25)

25 (100.0)

22 (88.0)

Other (n=36)

24 (66.7)

15 (41.7)

< 0.001

< 0.001

1984-89 (n=40)

31 (77.5)

22 (55.0)

1990-94 (n=53)

44 (83.0)

36 (67.9)

1995-99 (n=81)

67 (82.7)

54 (66.7)

2000-Present (n=36)

32 (88.9)

21 (58.3)

0.63

0.48

(n=20)
Cancer (n=11)
Cardiovascular, diabetes mellitus,

P value
Approval Year

P value

Figure 3. Generic Drug Approvals for Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US
Food and Drug Administration Eligible for Generic Competition
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Time to Generic Drug Approvals
On the date of first generic drug approval, the median number of FDAapproved generic drugs was 1 (IQR, 1-3) (Figure 4). At 180 days after first generic
drug approval, at which point additional generic drugs could be approved if the
initial generic drug won 180-day exclusivity, a median of 2 generic drugs was
approved (IQR, 1-6). At one year after first generic drug approval, the median
number of total generic drugs approved was 3 (IQR, 1-7), and at five years the
median number was 6 (IQR, 3-11). At 10 years, the median number of total
approved generic drugs was 7 (IQR, 4-11), and at 15 years, the number was also 7
(IQR, 4-12).

Figure 4. Median Number of Generic Drug Approvals Among All Drug Products
FDA-Approved After September 30, 1984 with at Least One Generic Drug
Approval by the FDA

14
12
10
8
6
4
2

15 Years

10 Years

5 Years

0

First Generic Approval
180 Days
1 Year

Median Number of Generic Drug Approvals
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Time

Generic Drug Approval by Drug Product Characteristics
Currently marketed drug products were more likely to have at least one
generic drug approval as compared to discontinued drug products (142 of 163
[87%] vs. 32 of 47 [68%]; p=0.002). Drug products that received FDA priority
review were less likely to have a generic drug approval when compared with those
that did not (61 of 82 [74%] vs. 113 of 128 [88%]; p=0.009), as were orphandesignated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (18 of 33
[55%] vs. 156 of 177 [88%]; p<0.001). The likelihood of generic drug approval
varied significantly by therapeutic category (p<0.001), with neurological drugs (26
of 26) and psychiatric drugs (25 of 25) having the highest rates and oncological
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drugs having the lowest (7 of 11 [64%]). The likelihood of generic drug approval did
not vary significantly by the initial approval year of the drug product (p=0.63).
Currently marketed drug products were also more likely to have four or
more generic drug approvals as compared to discontinued drug products (109 of
163 [67%] vs. 24 of 47 [51%]; p=0.05). Drug products that received FDA priority
review were less likely to have four or more generic drug approvals when compared
with those that did not (44 of 82 [54%] vs. 89 of 128 [70%]; p=0.02), as were
orphan-designated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (9 of
33 [27%] vs. 124 of 177 [70%]; p<0.001). The likelihood of four or more generic
drug approvals varied significantly by therapeutic category (p<0.001), with
psychiatric drugs having the highest rates (22 of 25 [88%]) and oncological drugs
having the lowest (3 of 11 [27%]). The likelihood of four or more generic drug
approvals did not vary significantly by the initial approval year of the drug product
(p=0.48).
Among the drug products with at least one generic drug approval, there were
no differences in the median number of generic drugs between currently marketed
and discontinued drug products (8 [IQR, 4-13] vs. 5.5 [IQR, 3.5-8]; p=0.06), or
between drug products that did and did not receive FDA priority review (6 [IQR, 311] vs. 8 [IQR, 4-12]; p=0.19). Drug products with orphan designation had
significantly fewer generic drugs approved than those without (3.5 [IQR, 2-7] vs. 8
[IQR, 4-12]; p<0.01). Rates of generic drug approvals varied significantly by
therapeutic category (p<0.01), with psychiatric disease having the highest median
number (10 [IQR, 6-15]) and cancer having the lowest (3 [IQR, 2-17]).
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Analysis B: Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug
prices and shortages

Characteristics of All Drugs Facing UDI
Since the UDI was launched in 2006, 12 previously unapproved prescription
drugs have received FDA approval through voluntary compliance, whereas 22 have
faced UDI regulatory action, for a total of 34 drugs included in our study (Figure 5).
Of the 22 drugs facing UDI action, 6 had no FDA-approved versions as of September
1, 2016, either before or after UDI action; 9 drugs had at least one FDA-approved
version prior to UDI regulatory action, but no NDA approvals after. The remaining 7
drugs had at least one NDA approval after UDI action.
Of the 34 drugs, 22 (65%) were first introduced into the U.S. market before
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938 (Table 5). For each year from 2006 to
2015, between 1 and 6 previously unapproved drugs received FDA approval
through either voluntary compliance or after facing UDI regulatory action, with a
median of 3.5 (Interquartile Range [IQR], 2-4). These drugs have a range of primary
indications, including 11 (32%) for pain-control, 6 (18%) ophthalmologic solutions,
and 4 (12%) for management of upper respiratory symptoms or allergies.

Figure 5. Sample Construction of previously Unapproved Prescription Drug
Products that Faced UDI Regulatory Action or Received Voluntary Approval
after 2006.
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Table 5. Characteristics of Previously Unapproved Drug Products Facing UDI
Regulatory Action or Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=34).

Drug Product

Atropine sulfate
ophthalmic
solution

Balanced salt
solution
(ophthalmic)

Year of First
Market
AvailabilityA

Primary FDAapproved
Indication(s)

Voluntary
Compliance
or
Regulatory
Action

Year of
Voluntary
Compliance or
Regulatory
Action

Before 1938

Cycloplegia,
pupillary
dilation,
ambylopia

Voluntary

2014

1960s

Eye fluid
replacement
during surgical
procedures

Regulatory

2008

34

Early 1950s

Seasonal and
perennial
allergic
rhinitis,
vasomotor
rhinitis

Regulatory

2006

Before 1938

Cough,
symptoms of
upper
respiratory
allergies or
common cold

Regulatory

2014

Before 1938

Mild to
moderately
severe pain in
adults

Regulatory

2014

Codeine sulfate
tablet

Before 1938

Mild to
moderately
severe pain in
adults

Voluntary

2009

Colchicine
injection

Before 1962

Acute gout
attacks

Regulatory

2008

Colchicine tablet Before 1938

Gout flares

Voluntary

2009

Dihydrocodeine
bitartrate
combinations

Before 1938

Mild to
moderately
severe pain in
adults

Regulatory

2014

Before 1938

Allergic
reactions,
anaphylaxis

Regulatory

2010

Carbinoxamine

Codeine
phosphate
combinations

Codeine
phosphate
injection

Epinephrine
injection/syring
e
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Before 1938

Vascular
headaches,
migraine

Regulatory

2007

Fluorescein
injection

Before 1938

Diagnostic
fluorescein
angiography,
angioscopy of
retina and iris
vasculature

Regulatory

2012

Freshkote
ophthalmic
solution

Unknown

Dry eye

Regulatory

2012

Hydrocodone

Before 1938

Cough, pain

Regulatory

2007

Ergotaminecontaining
product

Hydromorphone Before 1938
injection

Management of
pain where
opioid
Voluntary
analgesic is
appropriate

2011

Hydromorphone Before 1938
tablet

Management of
pain where
opioid
Regulatory
analgesic is
appropriate

2009

Levothyroxine
injection

Early 1960s

Myxedema
coma

Regulatory

2006

Morphine
sulfate
immediaterelease tablet

Before 1938

Moderate to
severe acute
and chronic
pain where
opioid
analgesic is
appropriate

Voluntary

2008

Morphine
sulfate injection

Before 1938

Pain not
responsive to

Voluntary

2011

36

non-narcotic
analgesics

Morphine
sulfate solution

Before 1938

Oxycodone
immediaterelease tablet

Oxycodone
solution

Pancrelipase

Voluntary

2008

Acute relief of
an attack or
acute
prophylaxis of
Regulatory
angina pectoris
due to
coronary
artery disease

2010

Unknown

Ear pain,
infection, and
inflammation

Regulatory

2015

1939

Acute and
chronic
moderate to
severe pain
when use of
opioid
analgesic is
appropriate

Regulatory

2009

1939

Moderate to
severe pain in
opioid tolerant
patients

Voluntary

2010

Before 1938

Exocrine
pancreatic
insufficiency
due to cystic

Regulatory

2010

Nitroglycerin
Before 1938
sublingual tablet

Otic drugs

Moderate to
severe acute
and chronic
pain in opioidtolerant
patients
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fibrosis or
other
conditions

Before 1962

Debridement
of necrotic
tissue,
liquefaction of
slough in acute
and chronic
lesions

Regulatory

2008

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride
(IV solution)

Before 1938

Increase blood
pressure in
acute
hypotensive
states

Voluntary

2012

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride
(ophthalmic
solution)

Before 1938

Pupillary
dilation

Voluntary

2013

Pilocarpine
hydrochloride
ophthalmic
solution

Before 1938

Reduction of
elevated
intraocular
pressure,
glaucoma

Regulatory

2012

Potassium
chloride oral
solution

Before 1962

Hypokalemia

Voluntary

2014

Before 1938

Uncomplicated
Plasmodium
falciparum
malaria

Regulatory

2007

Cyanide
poisoning

Regulatory

2013

Papaincontaining
topical drug

Quinine

Sodium nitrite &
sodium
Before 1962
thiosulfate
injection

38

Trimethobenza
mide
hydrochloride
suppository

Before 1962

Nausea and
vomiting

Regulatory

2007

Vasopressin

Before 1938

Vasodilatory
shock

Voluntary

2014

A For many drugs, the exact date of first availability could not be found.

Clinical Evidence of Safety and Efficacy
Nineteen drugs had at least one NDA approval after 2006 (Figure 5), either
after UDI action or as part of voluntary compliance. Evidence provided in the NDA to
support efficacy (Table 6) was based on a newly conducted clinical trial for 2 (11%)
drugs, a literature review for 6 (32%), demonstrated bioequivalence to a previously
approved drug product with the same active ingredient for 6 (32%), and both a
literature review and demonstrated bioequivalence to previous drug products for 5
(26%). Evidence provided in the NDA to support safety (Table 6) was based on a
newly conducted clinical trial for 2 (11%) drugs, a literature review for 5 (26%),
demonstrated bioequivalence to a previously approved drug product with the same
active ingredient for 7 (37%), and both a literature review and demonstrated
bioequivalence to previous drug products for 5 (26%) drugs.

Table 6. Clinical Evidence Supporting NDA Approval of Prescription Drugs
after Facing UDI Regulatory Action or Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=19)A.
Drug

Efficacy Evidence

Safety Evidence

39
Literature review of 57 studies
Atropine sulfate

from 1931-2013; 8 studies

ophthalmic

summarized in application (3

solution

randomized, 2 double-blind,

Literature review and statement of
long history and frequent use

average 173 subjects)
2 bioequivalence studies; reviewed
Safety events from 2 bioequivalence
4 studies from 1954-1956 (2
Carbinoxamine

studies; reviewed side effects in 4

placebo-controlled, average 105
subjects) involved in DESI review

studies from 1954-1956 from DESI
review

of initial carbinoxamine product
2 bioequivalence studies; summary
Codeine
phosphate

of data from 2 clinical pharmacology
2 bioequivalence studies

combinations

studies, postmarketing spontaneous
adverse events report, and a
literature survey

5 bioequivalence studies, literature
review of 159 studies; 6 studies
Codeine sulfate

from 1970-1978 used to support

tablet

approval (all randomized, double-

Based on safety reported in labeling
of reference product (codeine in
Tylenol #3)

blind, placebo-controlled, average
127 subjects)

Colchicine tablet

Conducted clinical trial

Conducted clinical trial; data from 14

(randomized, double-blind,

pharmacokinetic studies (total 314

placebo-controlled, 1-week long,

subjects); literature review (3

185 subjects); referenced 1 clinical

randomized controlled studies and

trial from 1987 in published

21 uncontrolled studies); review of

literature (randomized, double-

FDA and World Health Organization

40
blind, placebo-controlled, 43

postmarketing adverse event report

subjects)

databases

Recommended dosing based on
published literature and
Epinephrine

established clinical practice; based

injection/syringe

on previous findings for

Based on previous findings for
epinephrine in treatment of allergic
reactions and anaphylaxis

epinephrine in treatment of
allergic reactions and anaphylaxis
1 bioequivalence study; literature
1 bioequivalence study; literature
Hydrocodone

review

review (5 studies); review of adverse
events reporting system database

Hydromorphone

None - based on prior approval of

None - based on prior approval of

injection

hydromorphone products

hydromorphone products

Literature review of 45 studies

Literature review of 40 studies from

from 1953-2007 (1 open-label trial

1964-2004 (1 open-label trial

involving 14 subjects)

involving 14 subjects)

3 bioequivalence studies

3 bioequivalence studies

Previous findings for reference

Previous findings for reference

product, but no bioequivalence

product, but no bioequivalence

studies; literature review of 59

studies; literature review of 59

Levothyroxine
injection
Morphine sulfate
immediaterelease tablet
Morphine sulfate
injection

41
studies involving randomized

studies involving randomized

controlled trials

controlled trials

Morphine Sulfate

Previous findings from reference
1 bioequivalence study

solution

product

Oxycodone
immediate-

2 bioequivalence studies; literature

2 bioequivalence studies; literature

review of 10 studies

review of 10 studies

1 bioequivalence study

1 bioequivalence study

release tablet
Oxycodone
solution
1 clinical trial (randomized,
double-blind, placebo-controlled,
length of 2 weeks, 32 subjects);
1 clinical trial (randomized, doublePancrelipase

literature review of 15

blind, placebo-controlled, length of 2

randomized, double-blind,
placebo-controlled studies

weeks, 32 subjects)

(average 40 subjects, 23 days in
length)
Literature review only; no review

Literature review; review of

of protocols, study reports,
Phenylephrine

datasets, case reports, or site visit;

hydrochloride (IV

pharmacovigilance database; review
of spontaneous reporting system and

however, approved based on
solution)

generally consistent conclusions

adverse event reporting system
databases

overall
Phenylephrine
Literature review of 25 studies from
hydrochloride

Literature review of 5 studies from

(ophthalmic

1967-2004 (average 24 subjects)

solution)

1939-2010 (8 clinical trials, average
52 subjects)
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Potassium

Previous findings for reference

Previous findings for reference

chloride oral

product, but no bioequivalence

product, but no bioequivalence

solution

studies; literature review

studies; literature review

Literature review of 19 studies
Vasopressin

from 1997-2012 (11 randomized,

Literature review of 19 studies from

8 double-blind, average 62

1997-2012 (average 42 subjects)

patients)
A

Clinical evidence was reviewed for the first NDA approval after 2006 through either voluntary
compliance or after issuance of UDI warning letters.

Impact of the UDI on Prices
Of the 34 drugs facing UDI action or receiving approval through voluntary
compliance, 26 had prices listed in the Redbook during the two years before and
after UDI action or voluntary approval. Among these 26 drugs, the average price
during the two years before and the average price during the two years after UDI
action or voluntary approval increased by a median of 37% (IQR, 23%-204%;
p<0.001) (Table 7). In addition, 10 drugs had specific manufacturers with Redbook
prices listed from immediately before and after the date of UDI warning letter
compliance or date of approval with a label of previously “marketed without an
approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA. These 10 manufacturers increased drug prices from
immediately before obtaining approval to immediately after by a median of 122%
(IQR, 10%-351%; p=0.01).

Table 7. Average Wholesale Unit Price of Previously Unapproved Prescription
Drugs During the Two Years Before and After UDI Regulatory Action or
Voluntary Approval (n=26) and Specific Manufacturers’ Drug Unit Prices
Immediately Before and After (n=10).
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Drug

Year of
UDI
Complian
ce or
Voluntary
Approval

A

Unit
Price
(After)

Chang
e in
Unit
Price
(%)

Manufact
urer Unit
Price
(Before)

Manufactu
rer Unit
Price
(After)

Change
in Unit
Price
(%)

Unit
Price
(Before)

Atropine
sulfate
ophthalmic
solution

2014

$3.42

$3.88

13

$2.22

$6.35

187

Balanced salt
solution
(ophthalmic)

2008

$0.17

$0.18

6

-

-

-

Codeine
phosphate
combinations

2014

$0.80

$1.11

38

-

-

-

Codeine
sulfate tablet

2010

$0.43

$0.46

6

-

-

-

Colchicine
tablet

2010

$0.33

$5.82

1664

$0.17

$5.82

3324

Dihydrocodein
e bitartrate
2014
combinations

$2.63

$3.36

28

-

-

-

Epinephrine
injection/syri
nge

2010

$0.49

$1.15

136

$1.44

$2.28

58

Ergotaminecontaining
product

2007

$107.38

$138.60

29

$1.58

$1.89

20

Fluorescein
injection

2012

$6.60

$8.94

36

-

-

-

Hydrocodone

2007

$0.20

$0.26

26

-

-

-

Hydromorpho
ne injection

2011

$1.20

$1.34

12

$1.10

$1.01

-9

Hydromorpho
ne tablet

2009

$0.67

$0.85

27

-

-

-

Levothyroxine
injection

2006

$7.20

$18.00

150

$50.93

$180.00

253
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Morphine
sulfate
immediaterelease tablet

2009

$0.18

$0.20

9

-

-

-

Morphine
sulfate
injection

2011

$0.23

$0.59

154

$0.47

$0.48

2

Morphine
sulfate
solution

2010

$0.08

$0.08

5

-

-

-

Nitroglycerin
sublingual
tablet

2010

$0.15

$0.19

23

-

-

-

Oxycodone
immediaterelease tablet

2009

$0.35

$0.80

129

$0.57

$0.61

7

Oxycodone
solution

2010

$1.15

$5.55

383

-

-

-

Pancrelipase

2010

$0.46

$0.70

51

-

-

-

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride
(IV solution)

2012

$2.98

$14.40

383

$2.98

$14.40

383

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride
(ophthalmic
solution)

2013

$1.68

$7.50

346

-

-

-

Pilocarpine
hydrochloride
ophthalmic
solution

2012

$1.94

$6.20

220

-

-

-

Potassium
chloride oral
solution

2014

$0.02

$0.05

223

-

-

-

Quinine

2007

$3.31

$4.06

23

-

-

-

Vasopressin

2014

$2.18

$134.20

6070

$5.13

$59.40

1058

A We

report unit prices, which are per gram, per milliliter, or per piece (e.g. pill), because some drugs
in our sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed; manufacturer-specific
analyses are focused on the manufacturers to which the FDA sent UDI warning letters or that were
labeled as previously “marketed without an approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA.
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Impact of the UDI on Shortages
Among the 34 drugs facing UDI action or receiving approval through
voluntary compliance, 30 (88%) experienced at least one shortage between 2004
and 2015. Of the 34 drugs, 17 (50%) experienced a shortage in the two years before
voluntary approval or UDI action, and 25 (74%) in the two years after (p=0.05).
Three drugs had a shortage that began and ended on the same day, and were thus
excluded for the shortage duration analysis; among the remaining 31 drugs, the
median shortage duration for drugs in the 2 years before voluntary approval or UDI
action was 31 days (IQR, 0-339), whereas the median shortage duration in the 2
years after was 217 days (IQR, 0-406; p=0.05) (Table 8).

Table 8. National Drug Shortages of Previously Unapproved Drug Products
During the Two Years Before and After Facing UDI Regulatory Action or
Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=34).

Drug

Year of UDI
Issuance or
Voluntary
Approval

Shortage Days
(Before)A

Shortage Days
(After)A

Atropine sulfate
ophthalmic solution

2014

No Shortage

406

Balanced salt solution
(ophthalmic)

2008

No Shortage
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Carbinoxamine

2006

No Shortage

No Shortage

Codeine phosphate
combinations

2014

428

386

Codeine phosphate
injection

2014

No Shortage

No Shortage

Codeine sulfate tablet

2009

No Shortage

357
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Colchicine injection

2008

No Shortage

Shortage, number
of days not
determinable

Colchicine tablet

2010

339

No Shortage

Dihydrocodeine
bitartrate
combinations

2014

No Shortage

No Shortage

Epinephrine
injection/syringe

2010

31

564

No Shortage

217

Ergotamine-containing 2007
product
Fluorescein injection

2011

147

37

Freshkote ophthalmic
solution

2011

No Shortage

No Shortage

Hydrocodone

2007

No Shortage

310

Hydromorphone
injection

2011

717

628

Hydromorphone tablet 2009

No Shortage

153

Levothyroxine
injection

2006

No Shortage

383

Morphine sulfate
immediate-release
tablet

2009

47

No Shortage

Morphine sulfate
injection

2011

595

730

Morphine sulfate
solution

2009

39

526

Nitroglycerin
sublingual tablet

2010

400

No Shortage

Otic drugs

2015

153

5

82

554

Oxycodone immediate- 2009
release tablet

47

Oxycodone solution

2010

63

405

Pancrelipase

2004

No Shortage

174

Papain-containing
topical drug

2008

Shortage, number
of days not
determinable

126

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride (IV
solution)

2012

436

649

Phenylephrine
hydrochloride
(ophthalmic solution)

2013

No Shortage

311

Pilocarpine
hydrochloride
ophthalmic solution

2012

No Shortage

129

Potassium chloride
oral solution

2014

No Shortage

No Shortage

Quinine

2006

264

No Shortage

Sodium nitrite &
sodium thiosulfate
injection

2012

597

645

Trimethobenzamide
hydrochloride
suppository

2007

No Shortage

Shortage, number
of days not
determinable

Vasopressin

2014

730

376

“Shortage, number of days not determinable”: shortage duration could not be estimated because
shortage lasted fewer than 7 days or began and ended on same day, signifying that the shortage end
date is unknown.
A
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Discussion
Study Findings and Context
This study provides a comprehensive overview of the competitiveness of U.S.
generic drug markets and its implications for drug prices and shortages through two
analyses: a systematic characterization of the number of generic versions available
for drug products approved by the FDA between 1984 (when the Hatch-Waxman
Act was enacted) and 2015 (Analysis A) and a detailed evaluation of the unintended
consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for prices and shortages of
old drugs that had previously never formally been approved by the FDA (Analysis
B).

Overall Generic Competition Since 1984
Among all brand-name, tablet or capsule drugs approved by the FDA since
1984 and eligible for generic competition, we found that over one-third had three or
fewer FDA-approved generic manufacturers, including nearly one-fifth with no
generics. Furthermore, the likelihood of generic drug availability varied by key drug
product characteristics, including priority review status, orphan drug status, and
therapeutic category for which the drug is indicated. Orphan drugs, which are used
to treat rare diseases in the U.S., were significantly less likely to have any generic
versions and less likely to have four or more generics. Moreover, orphan drugs had a
significantly lower median number of generic approvals. The fact that orphan drugs
are less competitive is unsurprising, given the smaller market size and potential
profits for these drugs.
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Four generic versions of each drug were available a median of two years
after the first generic approval, suggesting that there is some lag between the time
when generic drugs are eligible to enter the market and the time when there are
sufficient numbers of generic versions to significantly decrease drug prices.
Furthermore, generic markets seem to reach a saturation level ten years after the
first generic drug is approved, at which point a median of seven generic drugs have
been approved.
Prior research on competitiveness of generic drug markets has relied on
alternate measures to examine pharmaceutical competition, including the speed of
generic penetration into the market, the time between brand-name approval and
first generic launch (i.e. market exclusivity period), and the number of generic
patent challenges.17-19,64,65 One study determined the average number of generic
manufacturers for only cancer drugs between 2001 and 2007.66 A more recent
article discusses specific off-patent essential medicines that have increased
dramatically in price as a consequence of weak competition, and lists additional
essential medicines that may also be vulnerable to price increases.67 Our study
extends these findings by considering all brand-name drugs eligible for generic
competition, while also examining the number of subsequent generic drug
approvals.
The fact that more than 80% of brand-name drugs were found to have at
least one bioequivalent generic illustrates the success of U.S. drug policy in
promoting generic drug availability through the Hatch-Waxman Act and automatic
drug substitution laws. However, more than one-third had three or fewer FDA-
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approved generic drugs, which raises troubling questions about the potential gaps
in generic competition and the impact on drug prices and accessibility of generic
medicines for patients. We selected four generic drug approvals as a sufficient
threshold for stimulation of price competition based on prior research.6,30,32

Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative
In our evaluation of the Unapproved Drugs Initiative, we identified 34
previously unapproved prescription drugs that either faced UDI regulatory action or
received approval after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance; among
these drugs, both prices and shortages increased significantly after UDI action.
Specific manufacturers dramatically raised prices after obtaining approval for drugs
they were already marketing without approval. In addition, nearly all drugs that
received new approval through voluntary compliance or after UDI regulatory action
were supported by literature reviews and bioequivalence to older drugs, not new
clinical trials. These findings suggest that the UDI had the unintended consequence
of increasing both drug prices and shortages, while rarely generating additional
clinical evidence of safety or efficacy.
Of course, ensuring the safety and efficacy of all marketed drugs is an
important FDA responsibility and is essential for high-quality patient care.
Unapproved drugs can present real dangers as they may be unsafe, ineffective,
improperly labeled, of low quality due to substandard manufacturing processes,
confusing due to unregulated trade names, or difficult to monitor after they are on
the market; they also may challenge the integrity of the FDA drug approval system.37
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However, our findings suggest that the approval process itself did not necessarily
establish that these drugs were more safe or effective than had been understood
pre-approval. This may be acceptable, considering physicians have been using these
drugs for decades. However, satisfying these FDA approval requirements may have
had negative consequences for patient care.

Implications
This study has important implications for patient access to medicines and for
efforts to prevent price increases of old, off-patent drugs with generic versions.
Once a brand-name drug’s patents expire, generic medicines undoubtedly and
quickly become available at a significantly lower price that often remains low.
However, if drugs do not experience enough of a price reduction or suddenly
increase in price, patients may no longer be able to afford their medications, with
important implications both for adherence and overall health outcomes.7,8 This
section includes a case study of naloxone to illustrate the dynamics of limited
generic competition, increasing prices, and consequences for patient access.
Consequences for patients are similar for the UDI, which this study shows
inadvertently increased drug prices and shortages of old drugs by reducing the
number of the manufacturers. This section will elucidate the mechanisms by which
the UDI allowed this to happen.
There are several reasons for why specific drugs that have been available in
generic form for years do not have sufficient competition to prevent increasing
prices. This section discusses these explanatory factors, potential solutions to
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increase the competitiveness of these drug markets, and regulatory steps to limit
price increases. The suggested solutions for the UDI’s unintended consequences are
more specific and discussed after. These steps are critical to stemming the growing
trend of increasing generic drug prices and to maintaining patient access.

Overall Generic Competition Since 1984
Our findings suggest that more than one-third of drugs approved after 1984
are vulnerable to increasing prices. Though investigating the prices of these specific
drugs is outside the scope of the study, it is troubling that such a substantial
proportion of drugs sold in the U.S. exist in monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions.
Furthermore, these drugs are increasingly susceptible to dramatic price
manipulation through pharmaceutical companies’ growing – and in sometimes
principal – strategy of acquiring the rights to old drugs with few manufacturers and
dramatically increasing prices.5,68 For example, after acquiring the rights to drugs,
Turing increased pyrimethamine’s (brand: Daraprim) price by 5000% and Valeant
increased the price of isoproterenol (brand: Isuprel) by over 3600%. More recently,
Mylan faced Congressional investigations for raising the price of Epipen, an autoinjector containing the century-old drug epinephrine, by 600% over the past
decade.

CASE IN POINT: NALOXONE

One drug that has received comparatively less attention is naloxone, an
antidote to opioid overdose. The case of naloxone serves as an illustrative example
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for the dynamics of generic competition, highlighting key elements of the trend of
increasing prices of off-patent drugs: limited generic competition, weak regulation,
pharmaceutical companies’ opportunistic price-gouging, and patient affordability
and accessibility.
The Food and Drug Administration first approved naloxone in 1971 as an
injection (Narcan) for reversing opioid intoxication or overdose. Although the
brand-name version has been discontinued, generic versions of naloxone have been
available since 1985, and today injections are available in two doses (0.4 mg per
milliliter and 1 mg per milliliter; see Table 9). In 2014, the FDA fast-tracked
approval of the first auto-injector formulation (Evzio), a fixed-dose single injection
designed to allow people without medical training to reverse opioid overdose. In
2015, the agency fast-tracked approval of the first nasal-spray formulation (also
marketed as Narcan); previously, naloxone injections (larger vials of a 1-mg-permilliliter dose) had routinely been used off-label with an atomizer for nasal delivery.
Each formulation of naloxone — two injection doses, Narcan nasal spray, and
Evzio auto-injector — essentially has one supplier. Though there are three
manufacturers with FDA approval for 0.4-mg-per-milliliter-dose injections, the vast
majority are sold by Hospira, which has increased the price by 129% since 2012
(Table 9). Only Amphastar manufactures 1-mg-per-milliliter injections, the dose
used off-label as a nasal spray, which currently costs $39.60 after a 95% increase in
September 2014. Newer, easier-to-use formulations are even more expensive.
Narcan costs $150 for two nasal-spray doses. A two-dose Evzio package was priced
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at $690 in 2014 but is $4,500 today, a price increase of more than 500% in just over
2 years.

Table 9. Recent and Current PricesA for Naloxone.
Naloxone
Product

Dose and Form

1 mg-per-milliliter vial
Injectable or (2 ml) (mucosal
intranasal
atomizer device
separate)
0.4 mg-per-milliliter
vial (10 ml)
0.4 mg-per-milliliter
Injectable
vial (1 ml)
0.4 mg-per-milliliter
vial (1 ml)
Evzio autoinjector

Two-pack of single-use
prefilled auto-injectors

Narcan
nasal spray

Two-pack of single-use
intranasal devices

Manufacturer

Previous
Price (yr)

2016
Price

Amphastar

$20.34
(2009)

$39.60

Hospira
Mylan
West-Ward
Kaleo
(approved in
2014)
Adapt
(approved in
2015)

$62.29
(2012)
$23.72
(2014)
$20.40
(2015)

$142.49
$23.72
$20.40

$690
(2014)

$4500

$150
(2015)

$150

Price information was obtained from Medi-Span Price Rx, a reference for drug data and pricing
from Wolters Kluwer Clinical Drug Information.
A

The small number of manufacturers has likely enabled this rapid increase in
naloxone’s cost, which can have serious consequences for a particularly vulnerable
patient population’s access to the life-saving drug. In combination with
stigmatization and lack of familiarity with the treatment among clinicians and
opioid users,69 the rising cost of naloxone may explain the relatively slow adoption
of naloxone. Despite the growing need for naloxone70 and the increased focus on
expanding the drug’s availability,71-73 between 2009 and 2015, the annual number of
total naloxone vials/injections sold increased only from 2.8 million to 3.2 million.71
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The rising cost of naloxone has affected local and state governments throughout the
U.S.,74 and despite Congressional investigations,75 manufacturers have continued to
take advantage of naloxone’s rising demand, limited competition, and the absence of
strong regulation by increasing prices.

EXPLANATORY FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Several factors contribute to limited generic competition for specific drug
markets, including decreased attractiveness of specific markets due to lower profit
potential, FDA regulation and application backlogs, and anticompetitive strategies
employed by brand-name companies. A number of solutions could help to increase
the competitiveness of these markets and improve regulation of drug prices.
First, limited profit potential for specific drugs can dissuade generic
manufacturers from entering markets76 and lead manufacturers to exit existing
generic markets.35 For instance, this study demonstrates that there is significantly
less competition for orphan drugs, which treat rare diseases with smaller patient
populations and smaller profit potentials. In addition, over time, for markets that
already have substantial numbers of generics, manufacturers may decide that there
is no longer an incentive to continue to sell specific drugs.35,77 Lower potential
profits may also explain the increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions of
generic companies, which further decreases overall competition.12,78
Second, more than 60% of all ANDA applications are currently in the midst of
the approval process, awaiting information from either the FDA or the applicant to
proceed.79 To its credit, the FDA has recently cleared its backlog of applications by
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responding, at least initially, to most of these applications,80 but the generic drugs
cannot be made available until final decisions are made. Many of these final
decisions rest on responses from industry as opposed to the FDA. Greater resources
to the Office of Generic Drugs in the renewal of the generic drug user fees act could
also improve FDA review times.81
There are steps that the FDA could take to help increase competitiveness in
generic markets. The FDA already prioritizes generic drug applications for drug
products for which there is no generic version available; for “sole-source” drug
products, meaning only one generic version is marketed; and for drugs in
shortage.82 However, drugs with three or fewer manufacturers currently serving the
U.S. market are also in danger of entering into a shortage, often due to
manufacturing difficulties or shortages of raw materials.34 Thus, the FDA should also
prioritize and expedite review of generic drug applications for drugs with three or
fewer manufacturers. Similarly, dramatic price increases, which are more likely
among drugs in monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions, can make essential drugs
inaccessible to patients—creating a de facto shortage—suggesting that the FDA also
currently has the legal authority to prioritize applications for generic drugs that
have increased in price two-fold or more in the past two years.
Third, to protect their profits and maintain monopolies, brand-name
companies engage in innumerable strategies to avoid generic competition. One
strategy employed by brand-name companies is to “evergreen” or “product-hop,”
meaning that they make slight changes in dosages and formulations of existing
drugs or form combination treatments, which allows for extended patents and
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exclusivity wherein generic companies are barred from competing.83 Older
formulations that have generic versions often cannot be automatically substituted
for the newer brand-name formulation. For example, as the patent was expiring for
Aricept (generic: donepezil), which was available in 5 mg and 10 mg doses to treat
Alzheimer’s disease, the manufacturer of Aricept inexplicably received approval
from the FDA for a 23 mg dose.84 This new dosage showed only a small statistically
significant improvement in cognition when compared to the 10 mg dose, but as a
result of new approval, the drug as a 23 mg dose could no longer be automatically
substituted at the pharmacy level with 5 mg and 10 mg generic versions of
donepezil. This can render prior markets with generic manufacturers – such as for
donepezil 5 mg and 10 mg doses – obsolete, since heavy pharmaceutical marketing
may convince doctors and patients that the older formulations are less effective.
In addition, brand-name pharmaceutical companies often refuse to provide
generic manufacturers with samples required to conduct bioequivalency studies in
order to receive FDA approval.85 Generic companies then must file litigation against
the brand-name company, which is a time-intensive and costly process. Newly
proposed legislation in Congress attempts to stem these practices.86
Various regulatory steps could also help to encourage competitiveness and
control generic drug prices. One solution is for the federal government to conduct
price negotiations and purchase large quantities of pharmaceuticals, which would
create stable demand that might motivate additional companies to begin
manufacturing the medication — a strategy that’s been used for vaccine
manufacturing.87 Second, governments could invoke federal law 28 U.S.C. section
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1498 to contract with a manufacturer to act on behalf of the United States and
produce less costly versions of patent-protect drugs. The government could utilize
this approach with Evzio’s patented naloxone auto-injector, for example, in
exchange for reasonable royalties — an approach that was considered for procuring
ciprofloxacin during the anthrax threat in 2001.88 Third, in response to increases in
generic drug prices, some observers have proposed allowing importation of
generics from international manufacturers that have received approval from
regulators with standards comparable to the FDA’s.89 Fourth, Medicare Part D
currently is prohibited from negotiating prices of prescription drugs; allowing
Medicare to do so could help to control dramatic drug price increases.

Consequences for the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative
The UDI represents one example of how a well-meaning FDA regulation can
have unintended consequences for patient access to affordable medications, with
several scenarios accounting for why the UDI often resulted in increased drug prices
and shortages. First, once the FDA takes regulatory action against manufacturers
marketing unapproved drugs, the few manufacturers already marketing approved
versions of the drugs, and the ones able to obtain FDA approval, may hold natural
monopolies or oligopolies until additional manufacturers obtain approval. Obtaining
approval, however, can be a lengthy process,90 and manufacturers may instead
choose to discontinue unapproved versions of the drug. Second, when a
manufacturer of a previously unapproved drug receives approval, it can market its
drug to physicians and payers as more safe and effective than unapproved versions
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that remain on the market from other manufacturers, such as in the case of
phenylephrine eye drops,50 which may eventually result in competitors
withdrawing from the market. Third, with new approval, manufacturers may file for
patents or receive market exclusivity, thereby barring generic competition, as was
the case with colchicine.47 All of these scenarios may lead to fewer competitors,
wherein prices are more susceptible to increases and shortages may also ensue if
the remaining manufacturers are unable to meet demand.91 For example, within
four months of a manufacturer receiving approval for phenylephrine eye drops, the
other three manufacturers withdrew from the market,50 which was followed soon
thereafter both by shortages and price increases.
To incentivize manufacturers’ compliance, the FDA takes action against other
manufacturers of unapproved versions of the drug.36 The FDA attempts to balance
this incentive with the potential implications for clinical care. When a manufacturer
receives approval for a drug, the FDA allows a 1-year grace period before taking
regulatory action against manufacturers of unapproved versions. The grace period
can vary based on the expected public health effects of immediate regulatory action
on patients; whether the effort to obtain approval was publicly disclosed; and the
difficulty in conducting any clinical studies and obtaining approval of a drug. Despite
the FDA’s efforts, including extending the regulatory action compliance date by 6
years to allow manufacturers of pancrelipase to obtain approval,92 we found that
shortages of pancrelipase still increased.
Our findings suggest several ways to mitigate the unintended consequences
of the FDA’s regulation of unapproved drugs through the UDI. First, the FDA views a
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short grace period as a way to incentivize manufacturers to be the first to obtain
approval of a previously unapproved drug, since it may establish a period of de facto
exclusivity for the first manufacturer.36 However, this strategy may ultimately be
short-sighted. Instead of allowing short grace periods to incentivize first approval,
the FDA should establish longer grace periods and also focus on encouraging
additional manufacturers to obtain approval. Second, as discussed above, the FDA
should consider prioritizing or waiving user fees for applications for previously
unapproved drugs. Third, similar to when DESI review was performed, the FDA
could potentially work with an independent agency to help manufacturers conduct
literature reviews and bioequivalence studies, making it easier for current
manufacturers of unapproved drugs to obtain approval and stay in the market.
Fourth, because these drugs have been marketed for decades, perhaps existing, realworld evidence could be used to assess their safety and efficacy, in addition to
determining how they are used in clinical practice. Finally, pharmaceutical
companies also bear responsibility for the UDI’s unintended consequences. Rather
than using the UDI as an opportunity to increase prices immediately after obtaining
approval for decades-old drugs that they were already marketing without approval,
companies should be held accountable to ensure that they price drugs fairly.

Limitations
Our study has important limitations that should be considered. In Analysis A
of the overall characterization of generic competition, first, we based our analyses
on FDA approval data. Approval does not necessarily indicate that the generic drug
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was marketed and may thus over-represent the number of generic manufacturers.
Conversely, once a generic manufacturer receives approval, it may decide to crosslicense with additional drug distributors and wholesalers, thereby increasing the
number of generic suppliers beyond those that received approval. However, generic
companies certainly would opt not to compete with themselves, and the licensees
are likely limited either geographically or by their relationships with individual
pharmacies. Second, our search did not account for authorized generic drugs, which
are distributed by the original brand-name manufacturer; however, the effect of
authorized generic drugs on drug prices is largely limited to the first 180 days after
the first generic drug’s approval.93,94 Third, we focused our study on only tablet and
capsule formulations of drugs. Injections and solutions, in particular, are generally
produced by fewer manufacturers because of more complex manufacturing and
distribution processes, as evidenced by disproportionate increases in prices and
shortages.95 Fourth, we focused on bioequivalent approvals of brand-name drugs
and did not determine whether within-class generics had been approved, which
may offer reasonable, lower-priced alternatives that can be substituted for brandname drugs. Finally, we analyzed only brand-name drugs containing active
pharmaceutical ingredients that have never before been approved by the FDA, as
opposed to their potential subsequent reformulations. However, this approach is
consistent with prior studies of pharmaceutical competition,18,96 in part because
approvals for reformulated drugs are subject to different lengths of exclusivity.
In Analysis B of the unintended consequences of the UDI, first, in our
calculation of shortage duration, we excluded drugs with shortages beginning and
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ending on the same day or lasting fewer than 7 days because it is not possible to
quantify their shortage duration. However, this likely led to our underestimating the
effect of the UDI on drug shortage duration. It is highly likely that drugs with
shortages of this length were actually in shortage, as the manufacturer withdrew the
drug from the market, but we cannot know how long the shortage persisted.
Nevertheless, our main analysis includes these shortages, as we determined
whether any drug shortage took place before and after the UDI.
Second, we presented data on average wholesale prices, which do not
account for manufacturer rebates to payers or patients. However, data on rebates
are not readily available from manufacturers. In addition, trends in prices still
provide valuable information on the effect of the UDI. We also reported unit prices
for each drug (i.e. per gram, per milliliter, or per piece), because some drugs in our
sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed. Thus, even a
change of $0.50 for a drug taken daily amounts to a $15 increase over a month.
Furthermore, we focused our analysis on the lowest priced version of the drug
available on the market, without knowing market share, potentially
underestimating the effect of the UDI on average price paid by patients.
Third, because the UDI analysis is an observational study, it is possible that
changes observed may have been influenced by factors besides the UDI, such as
increased demand for the drugs, other legislation or regulatory decisions, or other
non-regulatory factors or trends, such as manufacturer product profitability or price
competition. We were not able to identify an adequate control group of drugs that
did not face UDI action. However, while shortages have increased overall in the past
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decade,97 as we discuss earlier, from 2006 to 2012, the average generic price for
widely used drugs decreased between 7.2% and 14.5%, while as of 2013, only 20%
and 10% of generic drugs faced a price increase of at least 15% and 50%,
respectively.27

Conclusion
Generic medicines offer a significantly cheaper alternative to brand-name
drugs and have become an indispensable means of maintaining patient access and
adherence to treatments. Our study found that since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act,
80% of brand-name drugs approved by the FDA and eligible for generic competition
have at least one generic version. However, more than one-third of drug products
have three or fewer generic manufacturers, making them susceptible to
monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions that allow pharmaceutical companies to
raise drug prices, sometimes exorbitantly. This analysis has informed efforts at the
FDA Office of Generic Drugs to continue to revise their review processes to ensure
timely approval of affordable generic medications. Though there are multiple
reasons for decreased generic market competitiveness, this study investigates the
FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative, a specific regulation that unintentionally led to
fewer manufacturers, higher drug prices, and more frequent and longer shortages,
while not necessarily establishing their safety or efficacy based on newly conducted
clinical trials. Though the UDI is certainly a praiseworthy attempt to ensure that all
drugs, including those that are marketed without formal FDA approval, are safe and
effective for patients, careful revision and supplementation of the UDI are needed to
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ensure that all drugs are not only safe and effective, but also affordable and
accessible for patients.
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Appendix

Exhibit A: Currently Marketed Drug Products with No Bioequivalent Generic
Drugs (as of January 13, 2016)
Approval
Date

Generic Name

Orphan

Priority

Designation

Review

24-May-85

AURANOFIN

No

Yes

8-Nov-85

TRIENTINE HYDROCHLORIDE

Yes

Yes

26-Dec-85

NABILONE

No

No

15-Dec-86

CLOFAZIMINE

Yes

Yes

11-Aug-88

TIOPRONIN

Yes

Yes

31-Jul-90

OLSALAZINE SODIUM

No

Yes

26-Dec-90

ALTRETAMINE

Yes

Yes

30-Jan-91

SUCCIMER

Yes

Yes

20-Dec-95

CEFTIBUTEN DIHYDRATE

No

No

11-Jun-96

ALBENDAZOLE

Yes

Yes

19-Sep-96

NILUTAMIDE

No

No

Yes

No

PENTOSAN POLYSULFATE
26-Sep-96

SODIUM

9-Dec-96

ZILEUTON

No

No

14-Mar-97

NELFINAVIR MESYLATE

No

Yes

9-May-97

UREA, C-14

No

Yes
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29-May-97

TOREMIFENE CITRATE

Yes

No

11-Sep-97

DOLASETRON MESYLATE

No

No

22-Jun-98

RIFAPENTINE

Yes

Yes

18-Jan-02

NITISINONE

Yes

Yes

31-Jul-03

MIGLUSTAT

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

FERRIC
2-Oct-03
HEXACYANOFERRATE(II)

